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Abstract. In a paper published in Management Science in 2015, Stewart, Reimers, and
Harris (SRH) demonstrated that shapes of utility and probability weighting functions
could be manipulated by adjusting the distributions of outcomes and probabilities on offer
as predicted by the theory of decision by sampling. So marked were these effects that, at
face value, they profoundly challenge standard interpretations of preference theoretic
models in which such functions are supposed to reﬂect stable properties of individual risk
preferences. Motivated by this challenge, we report an extensive replication exercise based
on a series of experiments conducted as a quasi-adversarial collaboration across different
labs and involving researchers from both economics and psychology.We replicate the SRH
effect across multiple experiments involving changes in many design features; impor-
tantly, however, we ﬁnd that the effect is also present in designs modiﬁed so that decision
by sampling predicts no effect. Although those results depend on model-based inferences,
an alternative analysis using a model-free comparison approach ﬁnds no evidence of
patterns akin to the SRH effect. On the basis of simulation exercises, we demonstrate that the
SRH effect may be a consequence of misspeciﬁcation biases arising in parameter recovery
exercises that ﬁt imperfectly speciﬁed choice models to experimental data. Overall, our
analysis casts the SRH effect in an entirely new light.
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1. Introduction
In a recent paper published in this journal, Stewart et al.
(2015) (SRH hereafter) presented evidence from a series
of experiments putatively demonstrating that the util-
ity and probability weighting functions revealed by
ﬁtting standard economic models to binary choice data
were highly sensitive to changes in the distributions of
payoffs and probabilities in the choice sets. Although
the existence of some such sensitivity may be no sur-
prise (e.g., Etchart-Vincent 2004; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010,
2011; Drichoutis and Nayga 2013), the extent of mal-
leability identiﬁed by SRH is considerable. For exam-
ple, for some distributions of probabilities and payoffs,
SRH were able to produce concave utility functions
and inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions
as commonly reported elsewhere in the literature,
yet for other distributions, they generated mirror-
image patterns (i.e., convex utility and S-shaped prob-
ability weighting functions). For convenience, we refer
to the apparentmalleability of the utility and probability
weighting functions identiﬁed by SRH as the SRH effect.
At face value, the SRH effect provides important new
support for the model of decision by sampling because—
as we explain in Section 2—predictions of this model
(which we refer to as DbS for short) prompted its dis-
covery. More broadly, however, the SRH effect sets a
potentially severe challenge to a wide range of models
of risky decision making in the preference-theoretic
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tradition that interpret utility and weighting func-
tions as embodying an individual’s risk preference.
If researchers can, as SRH explicitly suggest, choose
the shapes of the functions they wish to reveal by
adjusting the set of gambles used to elicit them, then
the interpretation that such procedures reveal under-
lying preferences is undermined. Hence, the SRH effect
provides seemingly powerful new ammunition for those
critical of the adequacy of preference-based models of
risky choice (Friedman et al. 2014, Gigerenzer 2016) and
support to those who favour process-based models,
and in particular, the model of decision by sampling
(Stewart et al. 2006, Stewart 2009).
But, before interpreting the SRH effect as a strong
challenge to preference-based models (or support for
procedural models, including DbS), it is appropriate to
question whether the effect is replicable and robust.
That question is pertinent, not least, in the light of
contemporary controversy surrounding the replica-
bility of many of the ﬁndings in the behavioural sci-
ences and elsewhere (e.g., Maniadis et al. 2014, Open
Science Collaboration 2015, Camerer et al. 2016). Given
this background controversy and the challenging na-
ture of the SRH ﬁndings, we believe that good scientiﬁc
practice demands careful scrutiny of the SRH effect
via attempts at replication to properly assess its sig-
niﬁcance. With this motivation in mind, we report an
extensive set of replication experiments investigating
two key issues: First, we examine whether the SRH
effect is replicable and robust to variations in experi-
mental design. Preempting our results, we conclude that
the SRH effect is replicable and robust to many small
variations in experimental design. The second key issue
concerns the origins of the effect. Three dimensions of
our results point to a different interpretation of the SRH
effect. First, we are able to reproduce the SRH effect
in designs that turn off the mechanism that, according
to DbS, generates it; second, choice-based tests ﬁnd no
evidence of the effects predicted by DbS; third, by ex-
ploring parameter recovery in simulations of a sto-
chastic expected utility model, we ﬁnd evidence that
biases resulting from model misspeciﬁcation may
plausibly explain the SRH effect.
Inwhat follows,we report a set of 14 new experiments
conducted as part of what we call a quasi-adversarial
collaboration and combine these with a reanalysis of the
ﬁve original experiments. The term “adversarial col-
laboration” has been used to refer to experimental re-
search projects jointly planned and executed by two or
more researchers (or research groups) who have ex ante
conﬂicting hypotheses about its outcome (for discussion
and examples, see Latham et al. 1988, Mellers et al. 2001,
Kahneman 2003, Bateman et al. 2005, and Corrigan et al.
2012). Although our collaboration does not have exactly
this form (hence, the qualiﬁer “quasi”), the seven re-
searchers involved in this collaboration come from
different disciplines (economics and psychology) and
different labs and have very different degrees of prior
investment in the competing theoretical frameworks
that would be supported or challenged by the existence
of the SRH effect. We also use the qualiﬁer “quasi” to
signal that the set of experiments reported here did not
emerge from a common plan of adversarial collabora-
tion agreed before any of the experiments began. In-
stead, our collaboration emerged as subsets of the
present coauthors began to discover that we were un-
dertaking very closely related work exploring the SRH
effect independently at different labs. We then began to
compare results and, later, to discuss designs for new
experiments. Further experiments were subsequently
run by different subgroups of us, based in three dif-
ferent labs at two universities, using a mixture of lab-
based and online protocols. The development of the
designs involved varying degrees of consultation be-
tween us as well as key variations in designs and pro-
cedures, which we document. Through this process, we
have generated a rich source of evidence relative to
the SRH effect, which we bring together in this paper.
The somewhat organic evolution of the collaboration
does not mean that the set of replications, when viewed
as a whole, lacks structure. We argue that, although we
did not set out with this explicit purpose, the resultant
set of experiments reﬂect and, indeed, extend a repli-
cation strategy proposed by Levitt and List (2009). They
advocate a methodology involving replication at three
levels: reanalysing data from the original study to be
replicated; running fresh experiments using designs
approximating the experiment to be replicated; and,
conditional on replicating the original results, running
experiments to probe origins of the phenomenon
observed. Our experiments involve replication at all
three levels, and we also add a further dimension to
our analysis. Through our experiments, we generated
a rich data set based on decisions of 1,880 subjects that
we use to run a composite analysis combining SRH’s
original data with data from our new experiments. We
refer to this as our “meta-analysis.”1 This comple-
ments the individual experiments by placing conﬁ-
dence bounds on the size of the SRH effect and
allowing assessment of how it varies with some key
design features of our replications. As such, we in-
terpret part of our contribution as piloting an ex-
tended, four-level version of the Levitt and List (2009)
methodology enhanced by meta-analysis. Although
the meta-analysis conﬁrms a nonzero effect size, our
experiments and simulations combined, cast the SRH
effect in an entirely new light.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 re-
views key features and ﬁndings of the original SRH
study. Section 3 presents results from all four levels of
the replication process. Section 4 considers alternative
explanations for the SRH effect, and Section 5 concludes.
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2. The Original SRH Study: Setup,
Motivation, Methodology, and Results
The main results in the original SRH study are based
on data generated from experiments in which indi-
viduals had tomake a series of choices between pairs of
gambles of the form “p chance of x, otherwise nothing”
or “q chance of y, otherwise nothing” (where p < q and
y < x). SRH used these data to estimate utility func-
tions over monetary payoffs (x, y) by ﬁtting an expected
utility model, and probability weighting functions
over probabilities (p, q) by ﬁtting a subjective expected
utility model.
All experiments followed the same logic, whereby,
for any given treatment, a ﬁxed set of (ﬁve or six)
money amounts was fully crossed with a ﬁxed set of
(ﬁve or six) probabilities to create a set of gambles. This
was then used to generate a set of pairwise choices
for any given treatment of the experiment, compris-
ing all possible non-identical and stochastically non-
dominant pairwise choices from the full set of gambles.
A further 30 choices were added in which one option
stochastically dominated as a catch for participants
paying insufﬁcient attention; those who chose domi-
nated options in more than 10% of catch trials were
excluded from the main analysis. The order of choices
was randomized across participants.
There were two treatments in each experiment,
which varied according to either the skew in the dis-
tribution of money amounts or the skew in the dis-
tribution of probabilities used in construction of the
choice sets. Each experiment then involved compari-
son of a treatment with a positive-skew distribution (of
money amounts or probabilities) against a treatment
with either a negative-skew or a zero-skew distribution
(of money amounts or probabilities). It was compari-
sons between these pairs of treatments that generated
the SRH effect. The actual amounts and probabilities
used in ﬁve of the different experiments reported by
SRH are depicted in Table 1.
Notice that the ﬁrst three experiments in Table 1
(experiments SRH 1A–1C) test for the SRH effect in
the utility domain by varying the distributions of the
money amounts between treatments, holding con-
stant the set of probabilities used to construct the set
of gambles. For example, in experiment SRH 1A, the
gambles are constructed using a common set of
probabilities in both treatments (ranging from 20%
to 100% in 20% steps), whereas the money amounts
range from £10 to £500 in both treatments, but for
one treatment (the positive-skew distribution), the in-
termediate outcomes are all in the lower half of the
range, and for the other treatment (the negative-skew
distribution), all of the intermediate outcomes are in the
upper half of the range. These experiments test how
changing the distribution of money amounts changes
the revealed utility functions. In the last two experi-
ments depicted in Table 1 (SRH 2A and 2B), the dis-
tribution of amounts is common across treatments for
each experiment, but the distribution of probabilities
changes between them. These experiments tested for
the SRH effect in the probability domain by examin-
ing the sensitivity of resulting probability weighting
functions to changes in the distribution of probabilities.
An example of the choice interface based on SRH 1A
is shown in Figure 1. At the top of the screen, partic-
ipants saw the distributions of chances to win and
prizes on offer across the set of choices. In most ex-
periments, this information was on screen continu-
ously while subjects made their decisions.2 Although
subjects were not explicitly informed about the num-
ber of choices they had to make, they were told about
the likely duration of the experiment, and a bar at the
bottom of the screen kept track of their progress. The
number of unique nondominated pairwise choices was
150 for experiments SRH 1A and SRH 2B, 120 for ex-
periments SRH 1B and SRH 2A, and 100 for experiment
SRH 1C. After making each decision, the next choice
appeared automatically. In any given choice, the two
Table 1. Amounts and Probabilities Used in the Original SRH Experiments to Create the Choice Sets
Experiment Domain Skew Amounts, £ Probabilities, %
SRH 1A Utility Positive versus negative 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 versus
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 versus
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
SRH 1B Utility Positive versus zero 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 versus
0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 versus
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
SRH 1C Utility Positive versus zero 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 versus
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 versus
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
SRH 2A Probability Positive versus negative 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 versus
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
10, 20, 30, 40, 70, 90 versus
10, 30, 60, 70, 80, 90
SRH 2B Probability Positive versus negative 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 versus
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99 versus
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99
Note. There was an additional series of temporal discounting experiments, which we do not address in this paper.
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gambles were presented in the form of text on sepa-
rate “buttons,” and subjects indicated their decision by
clicking on one of them. They were told that, at the end
of the experiment, one of their choices would be ran-
domly selected, and their chosen gamble would be
played out and paid for real using an exchange rate:
one pound equals one pence.3 All SRH original ex-
periments were conducted at the University of War-
wick (with one run online).
In a moment, we will review the main ﬁndings of
SRH. As a prelude to that, we note that the treatment
comparisons in SRH have a particular theoretical mo-
tivation because, as SRH explain, the DbS model pre-
dicts systematic differences between them. The DbS
model is a mechanism for the construction of choices
from a series of ordinal comparisons between pairs of
attribute values. Readers interested in the details of the
DbS model should consult Stewart (2009) and Stewart
et al. (2006, 2015). For now, the following property is
sufﬁcient: because the probability that an attribute
value will win an ordinal comparison is given by its
rank position within those attribute values available,
DbS predicts people will choose as if subjective value
is the rank position of an attribute value within all those
available. For example, consider the evaluation of the
amount £200 in the context of the distributions used in
experiment SRH 1B. In the positive-skew treatment in
which the amounts are £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and
£500, the £200 outcome is better than four out of ﬁve
of the other outcomes that are encountered. But now
consider the evaluation of £200 in the context of the
zero-skew treatment of experiment SRH 1B with the
distribution of £0, £100, £200, £300, £400, and £500. In
this case, £200 is better than only two out of ﬁve other
outcomes that are encountered. Thus, DbS implies
a higher utility for £200 in the positive-skew treat-
ment compared with its utility in the zero-skew
treatment.
Figure 2 shows the estimated utility and weighting
functions for all ﬁve SRH original experiments. In line
with DbS predictions, the utility functions [utility ex-
periments, Figure 2(a)–(c)] and the weighting functions
[probability experiments, Figures 2(d) and (e)] were
more concave when the skew in the distribution of
amounts or probabilities was positive than when it
was negative or zero. For example, the utility for £200
in SRH 1B is lower in the zero-skew treatment than
in the positive-skew treatment. The intuition from DbS
is that, because subjective value is given by rank po-
sition, subjective value must increase most quickly
when attribute value densities are highest. This means
a steeper increase early on for distributions with
positive-skew compared with distributions with neg-
ative- or zero-skew.
3. Four Levels of Replication
We now present the results of our new analysis. This
involves four levels of replication, extending the meth-
odology advocated by Levitt and List (2009) with an
additional stage of meta-analysis to take advantage of
the rich data set generated via our new experiments.
In terms of data analysis, our strategy is to use methods
that are essentially the same as those applied by SRH
except for some reﬁnements explained herein. We then
hold constant the statistical methods that we apply
across the four levels of replication reported in this
study.4 Analysis for each of the four levels is presented
as a separate section.
Figure 1. (Color online) Interface Used in SRH 1A
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Figure 2. The Revealed Utility and Probability Weighting Functions from SRH
Source. Adapted from SRH (their ﬁgures 4, (a)–(c) and 5, (a) and (b), respectively).
Note. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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3.1. Level 1: Replication by Reanalysing the
Original Data
As step one, we reanalysed SRH’s original experimental
data to estimate the revealed utility and weighting func-
tions. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁt an expected utility model with
a Luce (1959)–Shepard (1957)5 choice rule incorporating
a stochastic component to estimate utilities.
Prob(Choose safe)  bias
(
q u(y))γ
bias
(
q u(y))γ + (p u(x))γ. (1)
Here u(y) is the utility of the safer gamble’s prize,
which occurs with probability q and u(x) is the util-
ity of the riskier gamble’s prize, which occurs with
probability p; bias is a general tendency to choose safe
irrespective of the actual amounts and probabilities
on offer, and γ controls the level of determinism in
responding (γ  1 gives choice probabilities propor-
tional to the expected utilities, and γ > 1 gives more
extreme choice probabilities, so gambles with a slightly
higher expected utility are very likely to be chosen).
The advantage of this model, although it is perhaps
not obvious, is that, for simple gambles, it can be es-
timated as the following logistic regression:
log
[
Prob(Choose safe)
1 − Prob(Choose safe)
]
 ν + ω log
(
q
p
)
+∑
i
βiXi.
(2)
In Equation (2), each Xi is a dummy variable in-
dicating the presence of amount i as y (coded +1),
as x (coded −1), or absent from the choice (coded
0); ν  log(bias), ω  γ, and the utility of each amount
u(i)  exp(βi/γ).
A corresponding logistic regression for estimating
weights for probabilities is obtained by exchanging the
roles of p and q and of x and y.
log
[
Prob(safe)
1 − Prob(safe)
]
 ν + ω log
(
y
x
)
+∑
i
βiXi, (3)
where the weighting of each probability is given
by w(pi)  exp(βi/γ).
SRH give further details in their appendix A.
Our analysis departs from the original analysis in
SRH by using a different approach to estimate conﬁ-
dence intervals. We used a more reliable bootstrapping
method instead of the standard errors from the model
ﬁts used by SRH because we wanted to allow for the
possibility of asymmetric conﬁdence intervals. Fur-
thermore, we estimated the revealed functions sepa-
rately for each treatment. SRH used one model for
both treatments, but this is not ideal; random effects
cannot be estimated for all amounts for all participants
because each participant experienced only a subset of
amounts. Although level 1 replication identiﬁed some
minor calculation errors in SRH’s original analysis,
these did not change the conclusions of the original
paper. A detailed comparison between SRH’s original
analysis with and without those calculation errors can
be found in Appendix A.
The revealed functions from the replication anal-
ysis are shown in Figure 3. The panels correspond
to those in Figure 2, in which the original experi-
ments are presented. For example, a direct compar-
ison for experiment SRH 1A shows that the replicated
functions depicted in Figure 3(a) strongly mirror the
original functions depicted in Figure 2(a). The same
result holds for all experiments. Hence, we con-
clude that the level 1 analysis successfully replicates
the SRH effect in both the utility and probability
domains.
3.2. Level 2: Replication Using Variants of the
Original Design
In this section, we report a series of eight new exper-
iments run by different subsets of the current authors.
Each was designed to replicate one of the original
SRH experiments but with several design variations
introduced across our studies as set out herein.
Table 2 presents the details of the level 2 experiments.
For example, at the top of the table, the experiment
labelled “L2.a” is a replication of the original experiment
SRH 1C comparing positive- and zero-skewdistributions
of money amounts. The distributions of money amounts
and probabilities correspond exactly with those in SRH
1C. Subsequent columns of Table 2 indicate that L2.a
was an incentivized experiment with 54 participants
at the University of Warwick using 75 randomly se-
lected choices from the original study.
Looking further down Table 2, you can see that we
have replicated examples of both the utility and the
probability weighting experiments although there is
a focus on the utility domain. This is partly an accident
of history reﬂecting decisions made in the different
labs when they started running these experiments in-
dependently. But a focus on the utility domain may,
nevertheless, be useful for several reasons. First, util-
ity is arguably a more fundamental concept, compared
with probability weighting, in models derived from the
preference-theoretic framework; it features in a wider
class of models, and it is the core subjective dimension
in what has been the leading theory of risk preference—
that is, expected utility theory.
Although this focus seems justiﬁed by these argu-
ments, we also wished to include at least one level 2 test
in the probability domain—hence, the inclusion L2.h
(additional experiments with manipulations of prob-
ability are reported as part of level 3 replications).
Notice that across the series of experiments there is
variation in the skew (positive- versus negative- or zero-
skew), the domain (utility or probability), the location
(group that conducted the experiment), whether the
Alempaki et al.: Reexamining the SRH Effect
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Figure 3. The Revealed Functions Obtained from the Level 1 Replication Analysis
Note. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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experiment was conducted online or in the laboratory,
the number of participants, the number of trials, and the
incentives (by using both incentivized and hypothetical
experiments).
We think there is some advantage in focusing on
particular SRH experiments to see the effects of small
changes in procedures holding constant the distribu-
tions of amounts and probabilities. For this purpose,
we used SRH 1C, which contrasted positive- with zero-
skew distributions of outcome values, making exper-
iments L2.a–L2.e different replications of SRH 1C.
The advantages of choosing to replicate mainly ex-
periment SRH 1C are twofold: ﬁrst, we can use the
difference between the utilities of the common amounts
for a direct comparison (there are no common amounts
between the positive–negative conditions); second, the
round amounts used in the zero-skew condition are
more representative of amounts often experienced by
subjects in other experiments.
We also replicate SRH 1A, comparing positive- and
negative-skew in the distributions of amounts in a dif-
ferent laboratory than SRH 1A (our experiment L2.f). In
experiment L2.g, we pushed the boundaries further by
creating a distribution different from all the experiments
reported in SRH and by collecting the data online. Fi-
nally, L2.h is a replication of SRH 2B and, hence, in the
probability domain.
To estimate the utility and probability weighting
functions, we followed the same procedure as in level 1;
that is, we ﬁtted Equations (2) and (3) to the choice data
for the utility and the probability experiments, respec-
tively. Figure 4 shows the revealed utility and weighting
functions from the set of level 2 replications. For ex-
ample, the top left panel of Figure 4 depicts the revealed
utility functions from experiment L2.a, in which the
resulting functions were more concave in the positive-
compared with the zero-skew treatment: Subjects
assigned higher utilities to the common amounts of £100
and £200 when they experienced them in the positive-
skew treatment (relative to the zero-skew treatment).
Eyeballing Figure 4 reveals that the SRH effect is
replicated in seven of the eight level 2 experiments: in
all cases apart from experiment L2.e, we see a more
concave utility function in the positive-skew treatment
compared with the other (negative- or zero-skew) treat-
ments. Althoughwe cannot rule out other interpretations,
it seems possible that the failure to replicate in L2.e may
be due to sampling error. Either way, however, this
overall pattern of results is strong evidence that the SRH
effect is replicable and robust to a range of changes in
procedures and subject pools.
3.3. Level 3: Replication by Implementing
a New Design
Although our level 2 analysis provides substantial
evidence of robustness in the SRH effect, it does not
show whether the conceptual interpretation of the
original ﬁnding is correct. We, therefore, proceeded to
a form of analysis in the spirit of level 3 in Levitt
and List’s (2009) taxonomy. They suggest that level 3
replication should involve creating alternative experi-
mental designs to test the same hypothesis as that
tested in the original target of replication. We use
a twofold strategy to stress test the explanation of the
SRH effect based on DbS: ﬁrst, we conduct new ex-
periments in which, conditional on the truth of the DbS
account, it may be harder for the SRH effect to work;
second, we run tests in which, conditional on the truth
of the DbS mechanism, we would eliminate the SRH
effect altogether.
To this end, in one series of level 3 experiments,
which we refer to as ﬂagged experiments, we used
a within-subject design and presented participants
with choice options originating from two different
choice sets: one with a positive- and the other with
a negative-skew distribution. For example, in experi-
ment L3.a, choices with prizes from, say, the positive-
skew distribution were presented in videos by
“Joanne,” a young British woman. Choices with prizes
from, say, the negative-skew distribution were pre-
sented by “Patrick,” an older North American man
with a signiﬁcant beard. If participants can track the
distributions of prizes separately depending on which
speaker is making the offer, then DbS predicts people
will respond to the different speakers as if they have
different utility functions for each speaker. In experi-
ment L3.b, the different-speaker manipulation was
replaced with a different-product manipulation. In
some choices, people chose between lotteries for holi-
days with different values and, in other choices, be-
tween lotteries for mobile phones with different values.
Again, if people can track the values separately for the
different types of product, DbS predicts people will
respond as if they have different utility functions for
different types of product value. Thus, if participants
can simultaneously keep track of the two separate
distributions and choose as if their decisions are in-
formed by applying DbS separately to choices that
come from the separate distributions, then retrospec-
tively splitting the combined choice set into the original
two sets for the analysis will yield the same effects as
in the original between-subjects experiments. On the
other hand, we do not know that individuals would try
to use ﬂags and separate the distributions accordingly.
Even if they did, it seems possible that SRH effects
might be reduced because of interference and imper-
fect memory. As such, our ﬂagged experiments pro-
vide a tougher environment for the operation of the
mechanisms imputed by DbS.
Our second series of level 3 replication experiments
(which we label nonﬂagged) used the same within-
subject design just described except we provided no
Alempaki et al.: Reexamining the SRH Effect
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ﬂags (such as speaker or product type). Hence, in
nonﬂagged experiments, participants had no way of
knowing what distribution the choices belonged to
and, therefore, had no way of attributing choices to
one distribution or another. As such, although a DbS
model would still imply that any measured utility and
probability weighting functions would depend on the
background distributions of probabilities and amounts,
in these experiments there is effectively only a single
background distribution provided in the experiment.
Yet, as experimenters, for the purpose of analysis, we
can still retrospectively split the data and analyse them
separately for the two different distributions we used
to generate the choices. Were we to do this, however,
according to DbS, the SRH effect would disappear. So,
if we continue to observe the SRH effect in our non-
ﬂagged designs, that would be evidence against DbS’s
proposed mechanism as the cause of this context effect.
Indeed, it would be a ﬁnding that no existing model we
are aware of could account for.
Because of the completely within-subject nature of
these experiments, we reverted to the original SRH
Figure 4. Revealed Functions from the Replication Experiments in Level 2
Notes. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. Numbers refer to original SRH ﬁgures.
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modelling by ﬁtting one model to both conditions in
an experiment. (In practice, similar results are obtained
when a separate model is estimated for each condition.
See Appendix B for details.) Random effects can nowbe
estimated within one model because all participants
experience the attribute values from both distributions.
In the logistic regression form, the model looks as fol-
lows for the experiments estimating a utility function:
log
[
Prob(Choose safe)
1 − Prob(Choose safe)
]
 ν + τ cond + ω log
(
q
p
)
+ ξ cond log
(
q
p
)
+∑
i
βiXi.
(4)
An addition to the model described in Equation (2) are
the terms involving cond. In expression (4), cond is
a dummy to account for the two conditions (zero in-
dicates the positive skew; one indicates the other
condition). We set log(biascond)  ν + τ cond, γcond 
ω + ξ cond, and ucond(amounti)  ω + exp(βi/γcond) when
Equation (1) is adapted to account for both conditions.
To estimate probability weighting functions, we ﬁt the
following model:
log
[
Prob(safe)
1 − Prob(safe)
]
 ν + τ cond + ω log
(
y
x
)
+ ξ cond log
(
y
x
)
+∑
i
βiXi (5)
and calculate the weights via wcond (pi)  exp(βi/γcond).
These are exactly themodels estimated by SRH (see their
appendix A) and are extensions of our Equations (2)
and (3).
Table 3 summarises the set of level 3 experiments. As
in level 2, we varied the domain, location, incentives,
number of trials, number of participants, and whether
the experimentwas conducted online or in the laboratory.
For example, the second row of Table 3 describes the
details of experiment L3.a, which used the positive
versus negative skew in the distribution of amounts
from the original experiment SRH 1A and ﬂagged them
by labelling prizes as either mobile phones or holidays.
We present the main results of level 3 analysis in
Figure 5.
The top two panels of Figure 5 show results for
the ﬂagged experiments (L3.a and L3.b) in which
participants could potentially track to which distribu-
tion the attributes in the choice set belonged. The dif-
ferences between the revealed utility functions for the
two differently distributed samples of amounts remain:
in both panels the utility function using the choices from
the choice set with positive skew is more concave than
the one from the choice set with negative skew.
Surprisingly—and in contrast to DbS predictions—
when estimating the revealed utility and weighting
functions in the nonﬂagged experiments (L3.c–L3.f),
the comparison of curves within each panel still shows
the pattern of an SRH effect. It is hard to see how these
differences can be rationalized with the DbS model;
hence, the level 3 results at least partially challenge the
DbS interpretation of the SRH effect. We consider
possible explanations for these results in Section 4.
3.4. Level 4: Meta-analysis
The 19 experiments we have analysed in this study
(including the ﬁve level 1 cases from the original SRH
study) provide a large data set based on the decisions of
1,880 subjects and are suitable for conducting a meta-
analysis to examine the overall size, variability, and
moderators of the effect of context on utility and
probability weighting functions. We see this as a useful
complement to the replication analysis of levels 1–3 and
so as a natural extension of the Levitt and List (2009)
methodology in cases in which a suitable, comparably
rich data set has been generated.6
We ﬁrst estimated the overall effect size using the
differences in the revealed utility and weighting func-
tions between conditions across all experiments for
one attribute value. Subsequently, we calculated the
effect sizes separately for (1) the between-subjects
design experiments, (2) the within-subject ﬂagged ex-
periments, and (3) the within-subject nonﬂagged ex-
periments. From an explanatory point of view, the
comparison of results for experiments in categories (1)
and (3) is especially interesting: if the within-subject
experiments’ nonﬂagged effect size were as big as the
between-subjects experiments’ effect size, we could
reject the DbS interpretation of the context effects be-
cause the effect in the nonﬂagged experiments cannot
emerge through the mechanisms proposed by DbS.
However, if the effect size in the nonﬂagged within-
subject design experiments is smaller, DbS could still
remain a candidate model for the interpretation of
some part of the SRH effect.
For the effect size measure, we identiﬁed the amount
(or the probability) that was common to the two dis-
tributions in a given experiment and calculated the
difference between the utility (or weighting) functions
of the two distributions at that point. If no attribute
was common within an experiment, we picked the
two attribute values that were most similar to each
other across the positive- and zero- or negative-skew
distributions. For the experiments comparing zero-
versus positive-skew, £200 (or $200) occurs in both
distributions, so we subtracted the utility estimate of
£200 in the zero-skew treatment from the utility of £200
in the positive-skew treatment. For experiments with
positive- versus negative-skew distributions of amounts,
we calculated the difference between the estimated
utility of £200 and the utility of £310 for the utility
experiments (we used the £200 versus £300 comparison
Alempaki et al.: Reexamining the SRH Effect
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–22, © 2019 The Author(s) 11
T
ab
le
3.
O
ut
lin
e
of
th
e
Pr
op
er
tie
s
of
A
ll
Ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
fr
om
Le
ve
l
3
R
ep
lic
at
io
n
(o
ri
gi
na
l)
Sk
ew
D
om
ai
n
A
m
ou
nt
s,
£
or
$a
Pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s,
%
Lo
ca
tio
n
(s
am
pl
e)
N
b
N
um
be
r
of
tr
ia
ls
c
In
ce
nt
iv
es
Fl
ag
ge
d
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
d
L3
.a
(S
R
H
1A
)
Po
si
tiv
e
ve
rs
us
ne
ga
tiv
e
U
til
ity
10
,2
0,
50
,1
00
,2
00
,5
00
ve
rs
us
10
,3
10
,4
10
,4
60
,4
90
,5
00
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
ve
rs
us
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
N
ot
tin
gh
am
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
(s
tu
de
nt
sa
m
pl
e)
48
33
0
C
ou
rs
e
cr
ed
it
(n
on
in
ce
nt
iv
iz
ed
)
L3
.b
(S
R
H
1A
)
Po
si
tiv
e
ve
rs
us
ne
ga
tiv
e
U
til
ity
10
,2
0,
50
,1
00
,2
00
,5
00
ve
rs
us
10
,3
10
,4
10
,4
60
,4
90
,5
00
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
ve
rs
us
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
W
ar
w
ic
k
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
(s
tu
de
nt
sa
m
pl
e)
42
16
0
So
m
e
fo
r
co
ur
se
cr
ed
it
so
m
e
w
er
e
pa
id
£6
pl
us
up
to
£5
N
on
ﬂ
ag
ge
d
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
L3
.c
(S
R
H
1A
)
Po
si
tiv
e
ve
rs
us
ne
ga
tiv
e
U
til
ity
10
,2
0,
50
,1
00
,2
00
,5
00
ve
rs
us
10
,3
10
,4
10
,4
60
,4
90
,5
00
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
ve
rs
us
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
N
ot
tin
gh
am
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
(s
tu
de
nt
sa
m
pl
e)
45
45
0
C
ou
rs
e
cr
ed
it
(n
on
in
ce
nt
iv
iz
ed
)
L3
.d
(S
R
H
1A
)
Po
si
tiv
e
ve
rs
us
ne
ga
tiv
e
U
til
ity
10
,2
0,
50
,1
00
,2
00
,5
00
ve
rs
us
10
,3
10
,4
10
,4
60
,4
90
,5
00
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
ve
rs
us
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
N
ot
tin
gh
am
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
(s
tu
de
nt
Sa
m
pl
e)
50
45
0
£0
to
£5
L3
.e
(S
R
H
1C
)
Po
si
tiv
e
ve
rs
us
ze
ro
U
til
ity
10
,2
0,
50
,1
00
,2
00
,5
00
ve
rs
us
10
0,
20
0,
30
0,
40
0,
50
0
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
ve
rs
us
20
,4
0,
60
,8
0,
10
0
W
ar
w
ic
k
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
(5
0%
M
Tu
rk
an
d
50
%
Pr
ol
iﬁ
c
A
ca
de
m
ic
)
89
14
0
$2
.2
5
or
£1
.5
0
an
d
up
to
$/
£2
5
L3
.f
(S
R
H
2B
)
Po
si
tiv
e
ve
rs
us
ne
ga
tiv
e
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
10
0,
20
0,
30
0,
40
0,
50
0
ve
rs
us
10
0,
20
0,
30
0,
40
0,
50
0
1,
2,
5,
10
,5
0,
99
ve
rs
us
1,
50
,9
0,
95
,9
8,
99
N
ot
tin
gh
am
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
(s
tu
de
nt
sa
m
pl
e)
49
39
0
£0
to
£5
a W
e
us
ed
$
fo
ra
ll
A
m
az
on
M
ec
ha
ni
ca
lT
ur
k
(M
Tu
rk
)s
am
pl
es
an
d
£
fo
ra
ll
Pr
ol
iﬁ
c
A
ca
de
m
ic
an
d
st
ud
en
ts
am
pl
es
.I
n
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
L3
.d
an
d
L3
.f,
in
w
hi
ch
th
e
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tw
as
co
nd
uc
te
d
us
in
g
z-
Tr
ee
(F
is
ch
ba
ch
er
20
07
)
an
d
su
bj
ec
ts
w
er
e
re
cr
ui
te
d
vi
a
th
e
on
lin
e
sy
st
em
O
R
SE
E
(G
re
in
er
20
15
),
a
sh
ow
-u
p
fe
e
of
£7
w
as
ad
de
d
to
th
ei
r
ea
rn
in
gs
.
b
C
at
ch
tr
ia
ls
w
er
e
no
ti
nc
lu
de
d
in
re
pl
ic
at
io
n
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
L3
.b
an
d
L3
.e
.O
ne
su
bj
ec
tv
io
la
te
d
do
m
in
an
ce
in
m
or
e
th
an
10
%
of
ca
tc
h
tr
ia
ls
in
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tL
3.
d
an
d
th
re
e
in
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tL
3.
f.
Th
es
e
su
bj
ec
ts
w
er
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
fr
om
fu
rt
he
ra
na
ly
si
s.
In
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tL
3.
e,
w
e
de
ci
de
d
in
ad
va
nc
e
to
re
m
ov
e
th
e
5%
of
fa
st
es
to
rs
lo
w
es
tp
eo
pl
e,
al
lm
ul
tip
le
su
bm
is
si
on
s
fr
om
th
e
sa
m
e
IP
ad
dr
es
s,
an
d
th
e
5%
of
pe
op
le
w
ho
al
te
rn
at
ed
th
e
m
os
t
or
th
e
le
as
t
be
tw
ee
n
le
ft
an
d
ri
gh
t
re
sp
on
se
s.
W
e
re
m
ov
ed
32
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
on
th
es
e
cr
ite
ri
a
th
at
ar
e
no
t
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
re
po
rt
ed
sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
.
c I
n
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
L3
.b
an
d
L3
.e
,w
e
ra
n
fe
w
er
tr
ia
ls
w
ith
as
m
an
y
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
as
po
ss
ib
le
w
ith
in
a
ﬁ
xe
d
bu
dg
et
.
d
Th
e
ﬂ
ag
ge
d
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
w
er
e
as
fo
llo
w
s:
In
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t
L3
.a
fo
r
ha
lf
of
th
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
,1
50
po
si
tiv
el
y
sk
ew
ed
ch
oi
ce
s
w
er
e
fr
am
ed
as
ho
lid
ay
s
an
d
15
0
ne
ga
tiv
el
y
sk
ew
ed
ch
oi
ce
s
w
er
e
fr
am
ed
as
m
ob
ile
ph
on
es
.F
or
ot
he
r
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
,i
tw
as
th
e
ot
he
r
w
ay
ar
ou
nd
.I
n
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tL
3.
b,
th
e
ch
oi
ce
op
tio
ns
fr
om
th
e
di
ff
er
en
td
is
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
w
er
e
de
sc
ri
be
d
by
di
ff
er
en
tp
eo
pl
e
us
in
g
vi
de
o
re
co
rd
in
gs
.F
or
ha
lf
of
th
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
,P
at
ri
ck
de
sc
ri
be
d
80
ga
m
bl
es
fr
om
th
e
po
si
tiv
el
y
sk
ew
ed
se
ta
nd
Jo
an
ne
de
sc
ri
be
d
80
ga
m
bl
es
fr
om
th
e
ne
ga
tiv
el
y
sk
ew
ed
se
t;
fo
rt
he
ot
he
rh
al
f,
th
is
as
si
gn
m
en
t
w
as
re
ve
rs
ed
.
Alempaki et al.: Reexamining the SRH Effect
12 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–22, © 2019 The Author(s)
Figure 5. Revealed Functions from the Replications of SRH in Level 3 Using a Within-Subject Design
Notes. L3.a and L3.b involve ﬂagged choices; L3.c–L3.f do not. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. Numbers refer to original SRH ﬁgures.
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for experiment L2.g). Note that DbS predicts £200 in the
positive-skew condition to be a higher utility than £310
in the negative-skew condition. The fact that £310 is
a higher number than £200 makes this a conservative
comparison. For the experiments manipulating the
probability distribution, we calculated the difference
between the estimated probability weights of the
common 30% (for SRH 2A replications) and the com-
mon 50% (for SRH 2B replications) in each condition.
Weﬁtted a linear random effectsmodel to estimate the
effect of experimental design (between versus-ﬂagged
within versus nonﬂagged-within) and the skewness
comparison (positive-negative versus positive-zero)
usingmean differences.7 The results of themeta-analysis
are depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6 shows that our best estimate of the difference
between the revealed utility or probability weight of
the common attribute between the two distributions
(positive–negative or positive–zero skew comparison)
overall is 0.17, 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) [0.13, 0.22],
on a scale on which, arbitrarily, the utility of £500 for
the utility experiments and the weight of 99% in the
probability experiments are ﬁxed at one. Thus, taking all
our and SRH’s experiments into consideration, themeta-
analysis conﬁrms a positive SRH effect in our data.
We estimated the effect of distribution comparison
(positive–negative versus positive–zero). The estimates
do not differ between distribution comparisons but
could potentially differ by approximately 0.10 in each
direction (betaDistribution = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.09]).
That is, the difference between the estimated utility of
£200 from the positive-skew condition and £200 from
the zero-skew condition is similar to the difference
between the utility of £200 in the positive-skew con-
dition and the utility of £310 in the negative-skew
condition. However, there might be slight differences
as the conﬁdence interval is reasonably wide, leaving
open the possibility that there are real differences
between positive- versus zero-skew comparisons and
positive- versus negative-skew comparisons.
Looking at the effect sizes for the three designs
separately, the effect is largest in the between-subjects
experiments (MDbetween = 0.19, 95% CI [0.14, 0.24]). The
effect is reduced in the ﬂagged within-subject experi-
ments (MDﬂagged_within = 0.14, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.32]) and
is smallest—with a reduction of 30% of the between-
subjects experiments—in the nonﬂagged within-
subject experiments (MDnonﬂagged_within = 0.13, 95% CI
[0.03, 0.24]). According to the meta-analytic model, the
differences could be very small; they could be opposite,
such that the effects are larger in the nonﬂagged ex-
periments; or it could be that the difference between
the between-subjects experiments and the nonﬂagged
experiments is about as large as the effect itself in
the nonﬂagged experiments (betaDesign = 0.04, 95% CI
[−0.04, 0.12]). Given that the DbS account cannot apply
to the nonﬂagged experiments and the effect size in the
nonﬂagged experiments is estimated to be similar to
the two other groups, it is likely that much of the ef-
fect in the ﬂagged and between-subjects experiments
should not be attributed to the DbS model. In light of
this, whatmight explain the SRH effect in our data? The
next section addresses this question directly.
4. Understanding the SRH Effect
In the light of level 3 nonﬂagged experiments showing
an SRH effect even when it is not predicted by DbS, an
obvious question to ask is whether the SRH effect might
be explained as an artefact of this genre of experiment
and its method of analysis. To motivate this possibility,
we note that the recipe used to generate the choice sets in
SRH-style experiments, although based on a simple and
coherent strategy for testing predictions of DbS, may
not generate sufﬁciently informative choice sets for un-
biased parameter recoverywhen applying the estimation
procedures adopted by SRH and followed by us.8
The analysis is also characterised by a particular un-
derlying choicemodel thatmay not be correctly speciﬁed.
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider whether the SRH
effect could be, at least in part, a systematic bias arising
from some limitations of the model or estimation pro-
cedures to recover underlying preference parameters
(if those exist) from the choice data these experiments
generate.
We explore this possibility in two ways: ﬁrst, by
seeing whether it is possible to identify patterns pre-
dicted by DbS that are akin to the SRH effect but based
on analysis that does not involve ﬁltering the data
through an estimating model; second, we examine how
the SRH effect might emerge as an artefact of modelling
inferences.
4.1. Model-Free Tests for Effects Predicted by
Decision by Sampling
The data available to us provide a simple way of testing
for an effect predicted by DbS that is closely akin to the
SRH effect but using a form of analysis based on direct
examination of choice data, thus short-circuiting the
need for model ﬁtting.
Within a given experiment, we can identify a number
of identical choices for a given pair of gambles that occur
in both treatments (or skews) of a given experiment.
We focus this analysis on type 1C experiments because
these provide numerous opportunities for this type of
analysis and all of the comparisons are based on large
sample sizes (see Figure 7 for details). Type 1C exper-
iments feature money amounts of £10, £20, £50, £100,
£200, and £500 in the positive-skew treatment and
amounts of £100, £200, £300, £400, and £500 in the zero-
skew treatment. Given the recipe for constructing
choices, both treatments feature multiple choices be-
tween identical pairs of gambles, each involving two of
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the three amounts £100, £200, £500. This affords a direct
opportunity to test a prediction of DbS according to
which the likelihood of choosing, say, the safer of the
two gambles in any such pair should vary, predictably,
between treatments. To see why, consider a choice be-
tween a 20% chance of £500 and a safer option of an
80% chance of £100. DbS predicts more frequent choice
of the safer option in positive-skew treatments (in which
£100 is the third best outcome) as compared with when
the same choice is embedded in the zero-skew (in which
£100 is the worst amount).
Within the data gathered for type 1C experiments, we
identify 20 opportunities for testing whether such com-
parisons reveal support for predictions of DbS.We apply
a random-effects meta-analysis using odds ratios of the
probability of choosing safe divided by the probability
of choosing risky. Figure 7 shows the odds ratios for
each of the 20 choices and their 95% conﬁdence intervals.9
The number in brackets next to the description of each
choice (e.g., 841 for the ﬁrst row of the table) is the total
number of decisions on which the relevant test is based,
aggregating across the pair of treatments; although the
number of subjects is not generally equal across a pair of
treatments, every choice in every treatment involved at
least 300 subjects. The overall odds ratio is 0.90, 95%
CI [0.83, 0.97], which indicates that, across the set of
20 comparisons, subjects are less likely to choose the safer
option when they are in the positive- as opposed to the
zero-skew treatment.10 The direction of this difference,
however, is the opposite of that predicted by DbS. This
mode of model-free analysis, therefore, provides no
support for the effect predicted by DbS.
Figure 6. (Color online) Meta-analysis Results from Level 4 Replication
Note. Mean differences and 95% conﬁdence intervals are shown as a function of the experimental design for between-subjects and for ﬂagged
and nonﬂagged within-subject experiments.
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4.2. Possible Alternative Explanations for the
SRH Effect
We now explore how the SRH effects observed in the
model-based analysis might have arisen, assuming
they have nothing to do with DbS. We pursue this
using simulation analysis. We begin by using a very
simple preference model to generate synthetic choice
data for the choice sets associated with both the 1A
and 1C experiments. We choose these two experi-
ments because they are the ones that feature most
commonly in our replications. We then attempt to
recover the preference function generating the data,
using the SRH estimation procedure that we have
applied throughout.
We generate data for 200 simulated agents who chose
according to the sign of the net perceived expected utility =
[EU(C1) − EU(C2) + ε]. In this expression, EU(C1) and
EU(C2) are the expected utilities of a given pair of choice
options, where ε ~N(0, σ2) is a random error,whichmay
be interpreted as capturing imperfectly implemented
preferences resulting from carelessness or miscalcula-
tion (see Hey and Orme 1994). A simulated agent selects
C1 (respectively, C2) in any given choice when the net
perceived expected utility is positive (negative). We use
a standard power function for utility over consequences
with u(x) = xα, and we repeat the exercise for three
data sets generated using different but unexceptional
values of α (i.e., 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0). Following standard
approaches in the literature modelling real choice be-
haviour, we use two different error speciﬁcations with
either constant or range-sensitivevariance. In theﬁrst case,
the error is drawn from the same distribution for each
pairwise choice, and σ2 depends on the average range
between payoffs in the choice set. In the second speci-
ﬁcation (following Bruhin et al. 2010 and Fehr-Duda
et al. 2010, 2011), the error variance is determined
separately for each choice and is proportional to the
outcome range for that choice. Both error speciﬁcations
are widely used in studies that ﬁt preference models
to real choice data. Moreover, it has been shown that
incorporating heteroscedastic error structures greatly
improves the relative ﬁt of expected utility (see Hey
and Orme 1994, Hey 1995, Buschena and Zilberman
2000, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna 2010, Wilcox 2011).
Figure 7. (Color online) Meta-analysis of Model-free Tests (Odds Ratios and 95% Conﬁdence Intervals)
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Figure 8 shows the results of simulations for experi-
ments 1A (left-hand panels) and 1C (right-hand panels).
Results for all four panels are generatedwith α = 0.9, but
the qualitative patterns revealed in Figure 8 also hold for
both the risk-neutral and the more risk-averse prefer-
ences. The top two panels report results for the constant
error model, and the two bottom panels report results
for the range-sensitive error. In each panel, we plot
separate functions estimated for choices based on pos-
itive- and zero-skew choice sets. We also plot the true
utility function used to generate the data.
Consider ﬁrst the top two panels (constant error
variance). At the eyeball level, the estimated functions
approximate the true preferences rather well, and there
is no evidence of an SRH effect.
Things look quite different, however, when we
consider the bottom panels (range-sensitive error var-
iance). In this case, we observe marked differences
between the functions estimated on positive- versus
zero-skew choice sets; moreover, the differences we
observe (i.e., more concave function for positive skew)
are consistent with the SRH effect predicted by DbS
and those found in the experimental choice data.
In this simulation exercise, we consistently ﬁnd that
systematic biases in the recovery of underlyingpreferences
generate the SRH effect for agents who choose according
to expected utility theory with a heteroscedastic error.
Although we do not wish to argue for the claim that
expected utility preferences with range-sensitive er-
rors provide a good general model of behaviour for
real subjects in these experiments, we interpret this
exercise as demonstrating that failure to recover un-
derlying preferences is a plausible candidate expla-
nation for the SRH effect because we can mimic that
effect in a simulated environment in which agents
choose according to a very simple and rather standard
preference model.
Imposing a heteroscedastic error structure on the EU
model is not the only way in which we can mimic the
SRH effect in simulated data. To illustrate another
Figure 8. (Color online) Recovered Functions for Choices Based on Simulated Data with Added Noise
Note. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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possibility, consider an individual whose underlying
preferences are represented by expected utility theory.
Now imagine that same individual but with some of
the individual’s choices perturbed relative to under-
lying preferences as a consequence of following a
simple heuristic: speciﬁcally, playing it safe when the
stakes are high. Evidence consistent with such an
effect has been reported in various studies (e.g., Holt
and Laury 2002, 2005; Weber and Chapman 2005;
Fehr-Duda et al. 2010; Lefebvre et al. 2010). Here we
show that the operation of this heuristic is another
candidate explanation of the SRH effect.
Following a similar process to that described, we
simulate choices from an EU model with power utility
using choice sets having either positive or zero skew.We
then estimate preference functions as before using the
approach we have adopted throughout. The left-hand
panel of Figure 9 presents revealed functions based on
simulated choices for the choice sets corresponding
with the 1C experiments andwith α = 0.5. Notice that, in
this case, when the data-generating process is a pure
expected utility model, the ﬁt is essentially perfect re-
gardless of whether it is estimated from choices simu-
lated on the positive- or the zero-skew data.
The functions presented in the right-hand panel of
Figure 9 are generated in exactly the same way except
that the simulated choices have been tweaked to in-
corporate an element of “play it safe when the stakes
are high.”We do this by adding an increment to the log
odds of safe choices for the small number of choices
for which the amounts available were both above 100
and only 100 apart, that is, for outcome pairs 200–300,
300–400, and 400–500. By design, this can only alter
choices in the zero-skew condition, and it has the effect
of creating an SRH effect via the estimated function
based on simulated choices for the zero-skew choice set
becoming more linear.
Notice that the functions revealed for the tweaked
data—that is, with approximately linear function for
the zero-skew treatment and markedly concave func-
tion for the positive-skew treatment—mimic closely the
qualitative pattern revealed in the nonﬂagged level 3
replication of experiment 1C (i.e., experiment L3.c
shown in bottom left panel of Figure 5).
In line with the inference we drew from the simu-
lation exercise appending the expected utility model
with heteroscedastic error, we do not wish to argue for
the claim that expected utility preferences combined
with a play-it-safe heuristic constitute a good general
account of our data and, in particular, the emergence
of the SRH effect.11 Our claim is more modest. We take
these simulation exercises as an indication that the
SRH effect may well be a consequence of model mis-
speciﬁcation. We have shown that, if agents are ap-
proximately expected utility maximisers but their choices
depart from expected utility either as a consequence of
a heteroscedastic error or as a consequence of following
a play-it-safe heuristic, then, in either case, the SRH effect
can be expected to emerge in functions estimated via the
procedures used by SRH, which take no account of these
deviations from the preference model.
Although we believe this analysis renders the SRH
effect much less mysterious, we cannot and do not rule
out other forms ofmisspeciﬁcation as contributory causes
of the observed SRH effect (see Bhatia and Loomes 2017
for further related discussion).
5. Conclusion
We showed that the qualitative effects of attribute
distributions on utility and probability weighting
functions reported by Stewart et al. (2015)—which we
have labelled the SRH effect—are highly replicable. We
conﬁrmed the analysis reported in Stewart et al. (2015)
by reanalysing their original data using a slightly re-
ﬁned approach. We then replicated the SRH effect
across a set of fresh experiments using designs ap-
proximating their original setup.
Notwithstanding our ability to replicate the SRH ef-
fect as just described, however, results reported based
on new experiments, model-free analysis of choice data,
and simulation analysis of synthetic data, together, cast
the SRH effect in an entirely new light. A key result is
that we continued to ﬁnd the SRH effect in new ex-
periments designed such that the decision by sampling
model no longer predicts it. We also failed to ﬁnd any
evidence of effects predicted by decision by sampling
in model-free analysis of the experimental choice data.
Given these results, we explored alternative explana-
tions for it. Using parameter recovery simulations, we
were able to identify two candidate explanations for the
SRH effect. First, we showed that misspeciﬁcation of the
stochastic form of EU can systematically bias the esti-
mated utility and probabilityweighting functions in line
with the SRH effect. Second, we showed that the SRH
effect arises when a stochastic EU model is ﬁtted to
simulated data that has been tweaked to incorporate
a simple decision heuristic (playing safe when stakes are
high). Both mechanisms are plausible candidates for
explaining the phenomenon reported by SRH.
Although we do not interpret the SRH effect as
evidence for decision by sampling, our analysis does
not imply that the apparent instability of preference
functions identiﬁed by the original SRH paper should
be dismissed as irrelevant from the point of view of
those seeking to model risk preferences or to elicit them
from choice behaviour. SRH interpreted their evidence
as showing that the shape of the utility functions and
weighting functions estimated from choice data are not
just a property of the decision maker, but they are
fundamentally context dependent and vary with fea-
tures of the choice environment. Although our analysis
challenges the idea that the SRH effect is evidence of
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any irreducible context sensitivity, we accept that it is,
nevertheless, evidence of a genuine issue, albeit a more
familiar or traditional one to do with model speciﬁ-
cation. To the extent that our misspeciﬁcation inter-
pretation of the SRH effect is correct, in principle, the
SRH effect can be avoided by ﬁtting the “right model”
and thereby eliminating context dependence. In practice,
however, the right model may be an elusive creature,
and hence, problems of misspeciﬁcation and associated
context dependency may often be difﬁcult to avoid.
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Appendix A
The calculation errors in SRH’s original analysis that were
discovered as a result of our level 1 replication analysis are as
follows: In experiment SRH 1A, the original analysis takes
into account only 120 instead of 150 questions. However,
except for moving the functions slightly, this has no effect on
the difference between the two conditions. In the description
of the analysis of experiment SRH 2B it is mentioned that
none of the participants violated dominance in more than
10% of the trials. Our analysis shows that four participants
violated dominance and, therefore, should have been ex-
cluded from further analysis. Again, the differences between
conditions reported by SRH remain signiﬁcant after this
adjustment.
As we explain in the main paper, the level 1 analysis we
apply and report in the manuscript differs from SRH’s
original analysis in terms of the estimation of both the con-
ﬁdence intervals (i.e., we used a more reliable bootstrapping
method) and the revealed functions (i.e., we estimated the
revealed functions separately for each condition). To further
probe the robustness of the inference from SRH’s as well as
Figure 9. (Color online) Recovered Functions for Simulated Choices: Pure EU (Left-Hand Panel) and EU Plus Play It Safe Rule
(Right-Hand Panel)
Table A.1. Results from SRH’s Original Analysis Using SRH Raw Data with and Without the Calculation Errors
With the calculation errors Without the calculation errors
Experiment
Differences in concavity in
the revealed functions
Differences in weighting
common amounts or
probabilities
Differences in concavity in
the revealed functions
Differences in weighting
common amounts or
probabilities
SRH 1A χ2(1) = 6.36, p = 0.012 χ2(1) = 7.05, p = 0.0079 between
£200 and £310
χ2(1) = 11.93, p = 0.0006 χ2(1) = 22.75, p < 0.0001 between
£200 and £310
SRH 1B χ2(1) = 6.99, p = 0.0082 χ2(1) = 26.96, p < 0.0001 for the
common £100, χ2(1) = 7.16,
p = 0.0074 for the common £200
χ2(1) = 6.98, p = 0.0082 χ2(1) = 27.20, p < 0.0001 for the
common £100, χ2(1) = 6.77,
p = 0.009 for the common £200
SRH 1C χ2(1) = 3.50, p = 0.06 χ2(1) = 59.79, p < 0.0001 for the
common £100, χ2(1) = 50.47,
p < 0.0001 for the common £200
χ2(1) = 3.49, p = 0.06 χ2(1) = 59.75, p < 0.0001 for the
common £100, χ2(1) = 50.32,
p < 0.0001 for the common £200
SRH 2A χ2(1) = 2.18, p = 0.13 χ2(1) = 18.18, p < 0.0001 for the
common 30%, χ2(1) = 14.31,
p = 0.0002 for the common 70%
χ2(1) = 2.18, p = 0.14 χ2(1) = 18.22, p < 0.0001 for the
common 30%, χ2(1) = 14.41,
p = 0.0001 for the common 70%
SRH 2B χ2(1) = 181.5, p < 0.0001 χ2(1) = 41.72, p < 0.0001 for the
common 50%
χ2(1) = 119.6, p < 0.0001 χ2(1)=22.8, p < 0.0001 for the
common 50%
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our own (level 1) analysis, it is useful to test statistically
whether SRH conclusions would still hold when correcting
these calculation errors. Hence, we applied SRH’s original
analysis (without the reﬁnements we use in the analysis
reported in the main paper) to SRH raw data and compared
the results with and without taking into account these errors.
The results from this comparison are reported in Table A.1.
Even though there are some minor differences in the reported
Figure B.1. Revealed Functions from the Replications of SRH in Level 3 Using Two Models Instead of One
Note. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Alempaki et al.: Reexamining the SRH Effect
20 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–22, © 2019 The Author(s)
statistics with regard to experiments SRH 1A and SRH 2B,
the results are qualitatively very similar, and none of
SRH’s original claims are affected by correction of these minor
errors.
Appendix B
In our level 3 replication to account for the within-subject
nature of this series of experiments, we used only one model
including all random effects instead of using separate
models for each condition as we did for the between-subjects
experiments.
Figure B.1 shows the functional forms and the relative
conﬁdence intervals obtained by estimating a separate model
for each condition. By comparing Figure B.1 with Figure 5,
it is possible to see that both the estimated functional forms
and the conﬁdence intervals are very similar across the two
ﬁgures.
Endnotes
1Although this analysis exploits all the currently existing data that we
are aware of relating to the SRH effect, it is a limited exercise in the
sense of relying on data that come from our own and from SRH’s
previous experiments.
2Having this information on screen continuously does not appear to
be a decisive factor. For experiment SRH 1B, subjects completed the
series of choices without the distribution of chances and prizes on
offer being shown on screen during choices. This experiment pro-
duced qualitatively very similar results to experiment SRH 1C,
which used almost identical amounts and did have the distribution
of chances and prizes on screen.
3 In experiment SRH 1A, two choices were randomly selected for
payment. The exchange rate was halved for this experiment. In
experiment SRH 1C, the choices were hypothetical rather than
incentivized.
4Although one could entertain different approaches to modelling,
basing our approach on that used by SRH minimizes the chance that
differences between our results and theirs are due to modelling
differences, and holding the approach constant within our analysis,
allows us to rule out the possibility that differences across our ex-
periments or levels of replication could be plausibly attributed to our
statistical modelling methodology.
5Our results are qualitatively the same using the multinomial logit
model of McFadden (1976, 2001).
6We do not consider a meta-analysis of replication studies generated
from a quasi-adversarial collaboration as a sufﬁcient condition to obtain
a deﬁnitive estimate of the underlying effect sizes. However, we regard
it as an important step in the right direction.
7The estimations were obtained by using the metafor package in R
by Viechtbauer (2010).
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing an analysis
suggesting that differently skewed choice sets may indeed be dif-
ferentially informative for revealing underlying preferences.
9Odds ratios greater than one indicate an increase in the probability
of choosing safe in the positive-skew treatment. Odds ratios less than
one indicate a decrease.
10Our results also hold, qualitatively, using Pearson chi-square tests
for pairwise comparisons.
11Using real choice data, Stewart et al. (2018) show that the residuals
resulting from playing it safe when the stakes are high are alone
sufﬁcient to create the SRH effect. They explore the broader impli-
cations of this for the nongeneralisation of utility functions estimated
in different choice sets.
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